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BEYOND HUNTINGTON'S GATE¹

ORTHODOX SOCIAL THINKING FOR A BORDERLESS EUROPE: PRELIMINARY REFLECTIONS*

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We cannot conceive a European culture reduced to just its Western forms. [...] Europe is the predestined place of multiple, varied, and complementary creations, both spiritual and cultural. Europe is not – nor can it ever be – a monolith.

~ Mircea Eliade²

Europe's unification was a dream that haunted Europeans for generations. This was often attempted by sword, through empires and states trumping religious, ethnic and cultural identities, or by peaceful methods such as today with the unionist model of the European Union.

The purpose of this chapter is to emphasize the complementing missionary role that the Orthodox Church(es) from Eastern Europe can play within the solidification process of the European Union. Based on ecclesiology, spirituality and historical records, the Orthodox Churches prove to be consistent³ assets into public life, never claiming to replace, but always willing to work with the secular authorities.

¹ This chapter is based on research conducted by the author towards his PhD thesis in theological ethics on *The Social Doctrine of the Romanian Orthodox Church* -- thesis in progress at the London School of Theology, under the academic supervision of Professor Anna Robbins.

Church-State in Eastern Christianity

In Eastern Europe, since the creation of the nation States – a nineteenth century project designed to defeat the Ottoman Empire – the East-Europeans have never experienced secularism in the way that the Anglo-Saxons did, merely as an ‘armistice’ between Church and State based on mutual non-involvement. This is because the East-Europeans have never been divided by religion in the way that the Anglo-Saxons were, for the Anglo-Saxon model to become a necessity. With the Orthodox Church representing anywhere from sixty-five to ninety-nine percent of the population, the state was merely interested in controlling, befriending, and even oppressing the Church rather than in separating itself from it. In the words of Teodor Baconsky, a Romanian theologian turned statesman, the nation state feared the Church to the point that it systematically mistreated and humiliated it, never offering an apology for its crimes against the Church. As Baconsky writes,

Wearing a republican hat, burdened with the memory of the murders it has committed, and thrilled by its alleged mysticism, the modern state offers – on matters of religion – the gloomiest alternatives. It either *visibly persecutes the Church* (as Communism did recently), or it *entrenches the Church into political partisanship* and *manipulates it* for electoral purpose, transforming the Body of Christ into a resonance box, and into a docile voting machine. [...] Compared with its previous record, the post-totalitarian state became a *bon enfant*. The ex- communists started handling the catechism swiftly, the television comforted us with ‘pious’ documentaries, and the public life became heavily loaded with ‘worshipful’ personalities always present at religious festivals, albeit their visible non-Christian behavior.⁴

Although more pamphleteer than erudite, Teodor Baconsky’s determinism caricatures the behavior of the State as purely oppressive and Machiavelian, while somewhat overstating church’s vulnerability to political manipulations. Should this have been the case, one could have noticed it in the polls conducted to measure the trust level in public institutions. Following the collapse of Communism, the numbers recorded by polling institutions such as *The Gallup Poll* indicate that the Romanian Orthodox Church has consistently enjoyed the top level of trust, followed by the National Army and Mass Media.⁵

It is for these reasons of mutual influence that neither the State nor the Church accepted the Anglo-Saxon version of secularism, regardless of the character of the incumbent political regime. The Church never ceased

seeing itself as a moral warrant and as the defender of the weak, particularly because the Orthodox Church has always been a *Volkskirche*, or the people's church.⁶ With married priests usually assigned in their home village, the Church often functioned outside its institutional framework – more like a spiritual movement, occasionally influenced by elders living in nearby monasteries.

Historical Perspective on Orthodox Church-State Relations⁷

The decisive factors which determined the nature of Church-State relations in the history of Christianity emerged during the first three centuries, when the Church interacted with the State on positive⁸ and negative⁹ grounds, which were both religious and secular in nature.

The Roman-Byzantine Era

Following severe persecution against the Christians, one of the first imperial attempts to befriend the Church was a rather unsuccessful edict endorsed by Emperor Galerius in 311AD, which abolished all the laws incriminating the Christians.¹⁰ Two years later, a more successful edict endorsed this time by Constantine and Licinius granted the Christians with the right to exist and the recognition of their religion.¹¹ As a result, the Church not only became a public institution, but the concept of *freedom of religion*¹² was inaugurated for the first time, with the State as a neutral superseding warrantor of it. The succeeding barbaric invasions fostered a closer relationship between the Church and the State – particularly in the East – ensuring their mutual collaboration on issues of dogmatic unity and imperial defense.¹³

The Byzantine Emperor Flavius Marcian (450 – 457) inaugurated a new phase on Church-State relations. If by this time all the canons and dogmatic decisions of the Ecumenical Councils were already turned into public law, Emperor Marcian took a step further by declaring that the laws of the Church supersede the laws of the State, wherever a dispute might arise between the interests of the Church and those of the State.

The epoch of the Byzantine Emperor Justinian I (527 – 565) represents one of the most excruciating phases in the development of Church-State relations – a partnership emphatically known as *symphonia*, or the harmonious power sharing between the patriarch and the emperor. As the emperor becomes the civil ruler of the Church, all the bishops become

state dignitaries. As direct representatives of the emperor the bishops were further invested with authority beyond that of *public judges* – a prestigious authority granted by Emperor Constantine in the fourth century.¹⁴ The most notable piece of legislation inherited from Emperor Justinian are the *nomocanons*, which are mixed collections of Church canons and State laws concerning ecclesiastic affairs.

Under the Byzantine Emperor Heraclius (610 – 638) the relationship between Church and State intensified as a result of the Persian and the Arab attacks, yet political jealousy led to the first attempts for power separation. Despite the Church reaching its peak as a political power, its authority started diminishing particularly with the iconoclastic crisis.¹⁵ Yet, the legislation that was favorable to the Church stayed in force until 1453, when the Byzantine Empire vanished under the Ottomans.

The Post-Byzantine Era

With the collapse of the Byzantine Empire under the Ottomans in 1453, the new rulers did not eliminate the Church, but offered a status of *guaranteed inferiority*¹⁶ and *captivity*.¹⁷ In light of viewing authority as divinely ordained, the Church accepted the Islamic rule as legitimate, offering its obedience.¹⁸ The *sultans* assumed the privileges that rested with the Byzantine emperors as heads of the State, and recognized the Ecumenical Patriarch not only as a religious leader of the Christians, but also as their political leader, or *ethnarch*.

Nevertheless, with the nationalist movement in South Eastern Europe, the Ecumenical Patriarchate started losing not only its fiscal control, but also its political authority as some prominent nations, such as the Greeks (1833), the Romanians (1865) and the Albanians (1922-1928-1937), broke away and established their own autocephalous churches, even patriarchates as in the Romanian case. The “Resolution” of the *Great Local Synod of Constantinople of 1872* that incriminated nationalism (a.k.a. *ethnophyletism* or love for one’s kin) as sinful and conflict-generating remained unsuccessful.

Religious pluralism, imposed by the secularist movement that came along with nationalism, opened new venues for western missionary activities to be conducted in South-Eastern Europe not only spontaneously by the Protestant churches, but more systematically by the Roman Catholic Church through *Concordats* or ‘international’ agreements signed between the Vatican and the new nation States.

Towards a Theory of Adaptability¹⁹

There is a general consensus amongst the Orthodox ethicists that the Orthodox Church does not have a clear definition of the State, beyond that of an ephemeral, worldly authority.²⁰ This is because in its history, the Orthodox Church has been subject to a variety of governing systems which manifested completely different attitudes toward the Church, ranging from persecution to power sharing. Therefore, one can only have a clear perception of the relationship between Church and State in a historical context, rather than limited to a particular period of time. The later approach can only lead to reductionism and confusion, as one expert in the field puts it,

Whenever one speaks of Byzantium, one instinctively contemplates over two main sources of authority, the Emperor and the Patriarch of Constantinople, or the Empire and the Church. This relationship representing the two sources of power, the profane and the spiritual, is usually reduced to one single pejorative term: *caesaropapism*. This term is as obsolete in the history of statehood ideas as the term *theocracy* itself.²¹

While in the West, the destruction of Rome in 410AD by the Visigoths left a Church immature and vulnerable to embracing claims for political governance, in the East, the Church faced this political vacuum only a thousand years later when the Byzantine Empire fell under the Ottomans in 1453. By that time the Eastern Church already had a compelling record on how to handle political power and accepted the Ottomans as a legitimate authority, yet only within the constraints of Paul's endorsement of political obedience. (Romans 13:1)

Following the destruction of Rome by the Visigoths, the Western Church took upon itself the duty of governance at the expense of its spirituality, while Augustine's *Civitas Dei* (God's City) ceased being viewed in its eschatological dimension. In the absence of an imperial power, the Western Church had no option but to adopt the concept of just war²² for the purpose of defending its community *externally* (against the barbarians) and *internally* (against the lawbreakers). Later, with the "Germanization of Christianity," the Western Church became sociologically vulnerable to a culture of "a high level of group solidarity and a warrior aristocracy,"²³ which led to the Crusades and the turmoil which erupted into the Protestant movement and religious nationalism.

The Eastern Church disposed of its responsibilities with the policing and defending the community because it never faced a vacuum of imperial power. Unlike with Alaric the Visigoth, Mehmet II the Conqueror had a far more sophisticated understanding of Christianity, as Islam saw itself as an Abrahamic faith, sharing limited affinities with Christianity. In other words, while the name of Jesus was completely meaningless to Alaric, for Mehmet II the Conqueror, Jesus was the last greatest prophet before Muhammad.

Looking comprehensively into the relationships between Church and State in the history of Eastern Christianity, one can easily agree that this relationship was always a moving target. Emerging from the concept of *hypostatic union*, whereby Jesus Christ was recognized as fully divine and fully human, the Eastern Church defined itself as a *divine* and *human* institution. In practical terms, this meant that when the human aspect of the Church was under severe jeopardy (anti-Christian persecutions under the Romans, Ottomans and Communism), the divine aspect of the Church (the Triumphant Church), was able to thrust sufficient sense of spiritual triumph into the hearts of its flock.

In other words, the Orthodox clergy never governed in the public life in terms of policing and defending the community due to inherent theological constraints imposed by the nature of the Eastern Church. Besides, under conditions of persecution, the divine nature of the Church turned this institution into a timeless moral force which transformed a martyr into a saint.

Based on these preconditions, the relationship between Church and State developed on the ground of specific historical and theological constraints. According to an Orthodox canon lawyer, "in order to fulfill its mission, the Church performs its work through people, and the people live under the conditions of time."²⁴ Conditions of time imply the existence of cross-pressures and regulations imposed by the world in which the members of the Church live. In this context Christians must find ways to remain obedient to their authorities, and yet make their decisions on the principles of the Gospel, since none can serve two masters. (Matthew 6:24)

Regardless of the guaranteed obedience that the Christians offered to the State, the Church was treated more or less friendly, as its loyalty resided with the principles of the Gospel.

This "moving target" type of relationship is best described by a proverbial expression recorded by a medieval Moldavian chronicler, Miron Costin, who rhetorically wondered whether people live under the Age, or the Age under the will of the people. As implied by this expression, the members of the Church dangled between imposing their moral will within

the State – when conditions were permissible – and being subjected to State oppression whenever their religious beliefs posed threat or discomfort to state policies. The great success of this strategy of adaptability consists in the fact that it ensured the survival of the Church, as it neither antagonized the political power, whenever it proved completely hostile to the Church, nor accepted to be instrumentalized, whenever the political power proved friendly. This is because, while the Church endorses and legitimizes the State as divinely ordained authority, it does not pledge its loyalty to it. This is the reason why, the Church neither revolutionized against the State, nor obeyed it whenever the State demanded something contrary to the Gospel.

Leadership between *religion* and *secularism*

During the past four centuries, the model of statehood proposed by Hugo Grotius (1583-1645) was mainly an armistice meant to end sectarian violence in Western Europe over the issues of Christian doctrine and political loyalty which emerged from *cuius regio, eius religio*²⁵ disputes. It was only in 1648 that this model found practical applicability with the signing of the Peace treaties in the Westphalian towns of Munster and Osnabruck. These treaties contributed to Europe's fragmentation in the way that they legitimized the existence of Lutheran and Calvinist States, they have crystallized a political distribution of power between France, Sweden and Netherlands and somewhat Germany (split into several small States),²⁶ and they led to the emergence of nationalism as a political ideology.

Nationalist ideology proceeded to the invention of tradition,²⁷ and to the creation of the myth of common descent.²⁸ Furthermore, nationalism shifted the notion of sacredness from a universal language (Latin) to indigenous languages which became sacred in their own respect, and endorsed a sense of group superiority that solidified the idea of a nation State.²⁹ The Peace of Westphalia (1648) engineered the secularist movement which led not only to a separation between the Church and the State, but to a declaration of war against organized religion itself. By removing organized religion from the political epicenter, West European secularism created an existential vacuum of meaning and loyalty that was filled by the ideologies of nationalism and patriotism, both built on the dualist model of 'insider versus outsider,' or 'us versus them.' Europe's fragmentation was further ignited by the concept of state sovereignty which justified the concentration of power internally. This process was hastened by the effects of the Ger-

man *pietism*, as detailed by Koppel S. Pinson in his highly documented 1934 book *Pietism as a Factor in the Rise of German Nationalism*.³⁰

Consequently, the leaders of the State became accountable only to their own citizenry when they acted internationally, rather than to universal moral norms imposed by religious ethics.³¹ The main consequence of the war against organized religion was the State's claim to fulfill the duties towards the public. In other words, the State replicated the Augustinian version of *Civitas Dei* which found expression in the Church's assumed responsibilities towards the public such as social justice, policing and defense. In the absence of religious ethics, secularist ideologies argued over the accumulation and distribution of wealth, leading to totalitarian extremes such as *Fascism* (corporate control of wealth), and *Communism* (proletarian control of wealth.) Sobbing over these historical realities, a Romanian theologian wrote recently that

All these years, our continent was haunted by the destructive gamut of totalitarian ideologies and utopias, which were based on race-hating (Nazism) and class-hating (Communism). By illegitimately mixing theology with politics in a *sui generis* fusion of a 'secularized' religion and a 'religious' politics, these utopias represented 'perverse imitations' of Judaism in Nazism and of Christianity in Communism.³²

Currently, with the rapid diminishing of the Grotian statist model in Europe one should look into revitalizing the Kantian universalistic model, *not apart from, but in alliance with* Christian universalism – “there is neither Jew nor Greek” (Galatians 3:28) – which will solidify Europe's new identity. In the absence of Christianity, the EU might become subjected to a limited vision and to a guaranteed failure because the current loyalty to a dogmatic secularism fails to build durable coalitions.

As the Kantian model encourages a more cosmopolitan outlook, stressing trans-national solidarity (*jus cosmopolitanum*),³³ one has yet to wrestle with questions of procedure imposed by the current fiscal expression of globalization. One can make the case that with the collapse of communism, even the fiscal expression of globalization has chances to succeed once it manages to denounce the corporate ideology which currently dominates international trade. Or, in the words of Richard Falk, in creating “regional compassionate states” – as the EU attempts to become – one should undoubtedly legitimize a grassroots type of globalization “from below” rather than a globalization “from above” dictated by corporate interests.³⁴

Globalization is very complicated not only for cultural reasons, but

more so for economic reasons. The economic challenges imposed by globalization are best identified by Richard Falk who emphasizes that the integrative process of globalization affects the world as whole, not just particular states or unions of states. Secondly, in Falk's view, globalization is often associated with the rise of financial trade and markets which are not subjected to the territorial control of governments. Thirdly, the private sector has become increasingly transnational, diminishing the importance of territorial boundaries. Fourthly, international institutions such as the United Nations are anachronistic with contemporary realities, because the UN was designed when states had full control over trade and financial markets. Fifthly, the transnational private sector along with the global civil society has no right of participation or representation within the UN.³⁵

On the other hand, globalization is a thorny phenomenon because of its potential in creating cultural and religious mutations. These mutations might damage the stability of societies whose outlook on life is grounded in values now trumped by fiscal interests. In the words of a prominent Romanian Orthodox theologian, Ioan I. Ica, Jr.,

The destiny of cultural traditions and religions in a global world is symptomatic. Folk traditions are turned either into themes for ethnocentric essayistic speculations, or into folklore and objects of ethnography. Folk traditions become products for entertainment, being degraded into artisan manifestations, folkloric tourism, or into a type of entertainment aimed to the private consume of a community that sees itself as a warrant for historical consensus. Religions, on the other hand, either replicate themselves in a collectivist fashion based on identity and extreme, superseding, and anti-modernist movements of fundamentalist fashion—case in which they are ready to display a radical, exclusivist and polemic character—or they melt into a diffuse individual religiosity which is eclectic, relativistic, anonymous and syncretistic, as well as institutionally and politically disengaged.³⁶

The Third Way

In the new political theories of Europe, the alternative to Richard Falk's proposal for a "compassionate state" based on *social democracy* is often referred to as *The Third Way*. This concept is often credited to the *EU's Founding Fathers*, such as Alcide de Gasperi, Konrad Adenauer, Robert Schuman, Jean Monnet, and Denis de Rougemont who are currently the most influential Christian Democrat political philosophers.

The Third Way is a political concept of social democracy which

mediates between the *left-wing* politics, based on *democratic socialism*, and *right-wing* politics, based on *laissez-faire capitalism*. According to Anthony Giddens of the London School of Economics, The Third Way values 'equality,' 'protection of the vulnerable,' 'freedom as autonomy,' 'no rights without responsibility,' 'no authority without democracy,' 'cosmopolitan pluralism' and 'philosophic conservatism.'³⁷ It is often contended that this political concept originated from the *Subsidiarity Principle* of the Catholic social doctrine in symbiosis with Communitarian Personalism.³⁸ This Subsidiarity Principle argues that between the State and the citizen there should be a multitude of intermediary and autonomous groups working towards the common good. Or, in the explanation of a reputable Catholic ethicist, David Hollenbach, S.J.,

When communities are small or of intermediate size, they enable persons to come together in ways that can be vividly experienced. The bonds of communal solidarity formed in them enable the persons to act together, empowering them to shape some of the contours of public life and its larger social institutions such as the state and the economy. In a democratic society, the government does not rule but rather serves the social 'body' animated by the activity of these intermediate communities.³⁹

Built on the principle of non-trust, a *Subsidiarity-State* is designed to be decentralized precisely to diminish the natural tendency of power gravitation towards central monopoly. In other words, as Ioan I. Ica, Jr., puts it,

The Subsidiarity-State is designed to protect both the state against abusive individuals, or groups of individuals, as well as to protect the civil society and its groups against the abuse of the State.⁴⁰

Despite a visible appeal to religion displayed by the EU's Founding Fathers, the first draft of the EU Constitution continued the battle against religion as the text refused to acknowledge Europe's religious past. Loyal to a dogmatic secularism, the EU still refuses the obvious, thus placing the EU on the grounds of Anglo-Saxon historic resentments against the Vatican. Furthermore, with the inclusion of Romania and Bulgaria into the EU, two more Orthodox Churches bring their political influence and rhetoric on a public debate that seeks to recognize Europe's religious values. Obsessed with the remembrance of the Thirty Years Wars and with anti-Vatican resentments, West European secularist ideologues are neither accustomed to the East European religious experience in the public life, nor do they care learning about it.

A United States of Europe: A Two-Factor Proposal

This question was pluckily raised by one of the most influential Orthodox theologians, Dumitru Staniloae⁴¹ during World War II in response to a proposal of appeasement made by the Archbishop of York.⁴² In Staniloae's reading, the Archbishop of York suggested that, for purpose of cost, it should be in the interest of smaller states to secure their survival by joining the larger ones. While commending this idea as in complete agreement with Christianity's universalism, Staniloae seemed particularly concerned with the question of procedure. Just like Max Weber, who claimed that an organization could not be stable unless it benefited from the two factors such as *prophetic vision* and *institution building*,⁴³ Staniloae recommended that the only way in which a United Europe could be accomplished would be for its political designers, in their institution building endeavors, to adopt the Gospel as the ideological fundament.⁴⁴

A similar two-factor proposal was later suggested by Samuel P. Huntington⁴⁵ during the late 1960s, who recommended that international development should be based both on ideologies of social change along with institution building. Dumitru Staniloae contended that for the "United States of Europe" to ever become a stable institution it needed a prophetic vision anchored on Europe's basic religious identity which is Christian.

It would be both a naiveté and a grave danger to create an organization not on the basis of what the people are now, but on the basis of one's dreams and imagination. Soon, reality will take revenge and will sweep you away altogether with your organization, bringing also great disappointment.⁴⁶

If Dumitru Staniloae's contention was anticipatory (as he wrote this in 1939), the French vote on the *EU Constitution* of the early 2005 represented but the epitome of his argument.

Engaging the Church

It is often argued that in order for the EU to secure its political stability, it has to recognize Europe's Christian values. Yet, these values need to be recognized not only by the EU as a secular institution, but also by all Christian churches through an inter-confessional dialogue conducted in a manner that will avoid sectarian exclusivism. This process can receive sub-

stantial guidance from the dynamics of the existing ecumenical movement. With the Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomew I of Constantinople denouncing *ethnophyletism* as a political ideology that contradicts Orthodoxy's universalism and is often conducive of conflicts, the Orthodox Churches could prove stable allies in EU's institution building endeavors. In a long term, the Orthodox Churches not only will assist in breaking down ethnocentric selfishness, but they will unavoidably help redirecting the ethnic creations and values to the benefit of all.

Cultural Dialogue

In the mid-1990s, Professor Tomáš Špidlík of the Pontifical Institute in Rome, in a lecture entitled "The difficulties of democracy in the Slavic countries,"⁴⁷ made a few provocative observations in reference to cultural disparities between the Slavs and the Anglo-Saxons. Sworn to paint an assertive contrast, most of the patterns identified by Špidlík, to a certain extent, seem to be common throughout Eastern Europe. These patterns include the *government's personalism, government's excessive sensibility to criticism, inseparability of truth from the person claiming it, fidelity towards person, analytical or synthetic truth, truth as life, sacredness of the word, and the mentality of compromise*. Speaking of government's personalism, Professor Špidlík invokes Homiakov's Russian story of the mother who despite severe poverty is yet organized well enough to provide for her children and even build a church with her savings. This same image of dependency towards a caring authority is transposed into the Slavophil's dream of a 'batiuska czar' (daddy ruler), a mentality which, during communism, eliminated any consciousness of personal responsibility towards the common good. Concerning the *government's excessive sensibility to criticism*, Špidlík writes that,

They say that for an American, criticizing and scrutinizing the government is not just a privilege, but a duty of the free citizen. [...] On the contrary, in the Slavic Orthodox countries, criticizing the Government often creates confusion, while the bringing into the open of mistakes and inabilities of politicians is often perceived as a surgical intervention that lacks an anesthesia.⁴⁸

Nevertheless, the social attitudes towards people and values that emerge from cultural observations should be less regarded as obstacles between East and West, and more as opportunities for mutual cultural self-knowledge. Despite the highly acclaimed western individualism, the eastern fi-

delity towards a public person reveals new depths of individualism, particularly on issues of leadership.⁴⁹ As Špidlík's comments raise questions of dialogue between Eastern and Western Europe, one should note that criticism, even if constructive, is a highly sensitive dynamic of self-perception. While for a West European it might be easier to find compromises within contradicting challenges, for an East European, accepting a solution that one disagrees with is usually regarded as a personal loss.⁵⁰ Furthermore, personal detachment during the decision-making process is a status quo for a West European, while for an East European every sphere of social activity is dominated by personal relations.⁵¹

Conclusion

In the context of the EU's institution building process, it is highly unlikely that the Eastern Churches will ever seek political power as to govern in public life. On the other hand, it is very likely that the Eastern Churches will not ignore public policies that contradict the basic precepts of the Gospel and will express their influence through electoral venues. Therefore, as the Church is here to stay, the EU leaders need to be open and engage the Eastern Churches as partners rather than rivals.

The contribution that the Orthodox Churches could make towards the EU's institution building efforts can hardly be underestimated. Despite its record of occasional endorsement of a *primordialist* nationalism, Orthodoxy offers an inherent counterbalance to nationalist conflicts by carefully selecting, sanctioning, and universalizing the most exquisite national creations. Apart from bringing a new attitude towards life and values, Eastern Christianity seems sufficiently prepared to redirect the feelings of patriotism towards the larger European family, while reconciling political partisanship, serving as a moral warrant in interpreting law and justice, and promoting world peace. While safeguarding private entrepreneurship in light of the *Parable of the Talents* (Matthew 25: 14-30), the Church can also temper political and fiscal abuses which are conducive of political extremism and violence.

The contribution that Eastern Christianity could make not only towards building a borderless Europe but also a borderless world cannot be underestimated or treated superficially. History demonstrates that cultures and civilizations have the inherent capacity to generate complex zones of dialogue which often engender the most exquisite blendings of cultural and civilizational establishments. Huntington's contentious *fault line* in Europe,

alleged to separate Transylvania from the rest of Romania, not only proved an ideological fiasco, but unmasked Huntington's unfamiliarity with the existence of a stalwart blending between Latin culture and eastern spirituality -- a blending known as *Latin Orthodoxy*. Writing from the experience of this cultural and spiritual matrix, which is unique of Romania, Dumitru Staniloae heralds the promising potential for such cultural fusions between cultures and spiritualities to replicate.

If we will abandon our Orthodox tradition, not only will we cease to be a *living bridge between East and West*, but we will also lose our innate trait of being a unique synthesis of spirituality. [...] In our spirituality we combined the Latin lucidity, or the confidence in a rational apprehension of the real, specific to the West, with the sentiment of the impenetrable mystery of existence, specific to the East Europeans.⁵²

As the Romanians lived at the buffer zone of history, situated between the Ottomans, the Russians and the Austro-Hungarians, they became a unique nation in understanding how to bridge cultures and spiritualities between East and West, and how to offer criticism and strategic advice on issues related to cultural communication.

Therefore, in order for a borderless Europe to function beyond Samuel Huntington's *Clash of Civilizations* determinism, the Gospel must be allowed to speak in its pertinent version, rather than in its reversal, as scornfully⁵³ put by a Romanian philosopher, Mircea Vulcanescu, who wrote,

Blessed are the *wealthy* – answers this Age to Christ – for they have the kingdom of this world, and there is no world other than this.
Blessed are the *strong*, for they shall rule the earth.
Blessed are the *terrible and unmerciful*, for they shall fear nobody.
Blessed are *those who laugh and are happy*, for they need nothing else.
Blessed are the *bold ones*, for they shall be remembered.
Blessed are those *sowing wind*, for they shall be called the sons of the tempest.
Blessed are the *sneaky* for they shall hear many secrets.
Blessed will you be when they shall worship and glorify you, lying for you, for you already received your reward here and now, and tomorrow you will be forgotten.
Wealth is the supreme ideal of the man obsessed to pull from life as much and intense earthly joy as possible, during the short time given for this illusion.
Power is the means towards achieving wealth.
Shrewdness, aggressiveness, false accusation, meanness, self-ap-

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praisal, are all tools which make you gain the power and keep it. Once someone gained all of these, one will unavoidably proceed to *making up the essential values of the modern moral code*, especially because of one's hypocrisy will present all of these as benefic.⁵⁴

End Notes

- ¹ The "Huntington's Gate" expression is used symbolically in relation to Orlando E. Costas' work *Outside the Gate: Mission Beyond Christendom* (Wipf & Stock Publishers, 2005) and Samuel P. Huntington's *Clash of Civilizations* theory (published first as an article in *Foreign Affairs*, then as a book *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of the World Order* Simon & Schuster Paperbacks: New York, London, Toronto, Sydney, 1996). While Orlando Costas refers to a global mission that is open to cultural differences, Samuel P. Huntington places a deterministic spin on cultural conflict. In the case of Europe, Huntington predicted an unavoidable clash along the borders of former empires in Europe, by contending that Orthodox Christianity belongs to a culture which Western Europe can hardly accept. To Huntington's disappointment, following this ideological notoriety, the Orthodox Churches have even increased their communication with the Catholic and Protestant Churches from Western Europe, and Transylvania remained a part of Romania. Furthermore, as of January 1, 2007, both Romania and Bulgaria became full members of the European Union.
- ² Mircea Eliade *The Fate of Romanian Culture*, Athena Press: Bucharest, 1996.
- ³ An exception is the Moscow Raskolnik community, which not only split the Russian Orthodox Church into the official Russian Orthodox Church and Old Believers during the 17th century, but also claimed that the authority of the Church should supersede the authority of the State.
- ⁴ Teodor Baconsky "Decadenta etatismului si renasterea ortodoxa" p.354 in *Gândirea Sociala a Bisericii: fundamente, documente analize, perspective*, edited by Ioan I. Ica, Jr. and Germano Marani, Deisis Press: Sibiu, 2002
- ⁵ With minimal variations, the data collected between 1994 and 2006 indicate the following average: The Church 87%; National Army 67%; Media 62%; Mayor 45%; President 40%; Police 37%; Banks 28%; Government 26%; Justice 22%; NGOs 23%; Parliament 18%; and Unions 17%. For datasets recorded between 1994 and 2004, see, *Barometrul de Opinie Publica, Romania, octombrie 2004*; The Gallup Organization, Romania, p.53 http://www.gallup.ro/romana/poll_ro/releases_ro/pr041020_ro/pr041020_ro.htm (Last accessed on January 27, 2007.) For current datasets see Mircea Comsa, Andrei Gheorghita, Ovidiu Voicu *Barometrul de Opinie Publica* published by the Soros Foundation for an Open Society, October 2006 http://www.gallup.ro/download/BOP31_oct2006.pdf (Last accessed on January 27, 2007)
- ⁶ Radu Preda "Biserica în stat. Sansele si limitele unei dezbateri" p.369 in *Gândirea Sociala a Bisericii: fundamente, documente analize, perspective*, edited by

Ioan I. Ica, Jr. and Germano Marani, Deisis Press: Sibiu, 2002

⁷ This historical outlook is based on a chapter called “The Relation of the Church with the State” from *Orthodox Canon Law: Church Legislation and Administration* (pp.279-307) written by the prominent Orthodox canon lawyer Ioan N. Floca. Professor Floca’s compendium is used as the standard textbook in all Romanian Orthodox Faculties of Theology in Romania, and it is endorsed by the Holy Synod of the Romanian Orthodox Church. See Arhid. Prof. Dr. Ioan N. Floca *Drept Canonic Ortodox, Legislatie si Administratie Bisericeasca*, Vol. 1-2 Editura Institutului Biblic si de Misiune al Bisericii Ortodoxe Române: Bucuresti, 1990.

⁸ The positive religious factors were related to the Church’s ability to promote an innovative social doctrine that worked across the social strata, fostering an ethical equalitarianism, and bringing a superior juridical thinking. Superior to all existing Greco-Roman religions, Christianity brought the promise of an imperial cohesion, strongly desired by the Romans.

The positive secular factors included the sanctioning of state sovereignty by the Church as legitimate and divinely ordained (“Render to Caesar what belongs to Caesar and to God what belongs to God.” Matthew 22:21). Secondly, the State redefined its social structures in contrast with the precepts of Christianity. Thirdly, the State started promoting a lay culture in opposition to the religious culture promoted by the Church.

⁹ The negative religious factors emerged from a clash between Christianity and Greco-Roman pagan religions. First, paganism served as a symbiosis between the Roman state authorities and polytheism to the extent that the State identified itself with, and eventually served as an element of accusation against the Christians, as these were often regarded as offenders of the emperor’s public image and authority. In this case the State saw itself forced to defend paganism and punish Christianity. Secondly, the pagan religions felt threatened by Christianity because their civic privileges decreased with the loss of membership into the Christian faith. Consequently, false accusations were often the easiest weapon against the Christians. Thirdly, the initial close relations between the Christian and the Jewish communities from the Roman Empire led to negative relations with the Romans. As the initial Christian missionary activities targeted the Jewish communities, the Jews were often troubled emotionally and ready to denounce the Christians to the Roman authorities. Most of the early Christian passion narratives, such as the martyrdom of Saint Stephen (Acts 6:8-8:3), as well as the Martyrdom of the Holy Polycarp (“The Encyclical Epistle of the Church at Smyrna Concerning The Martyrdom of The Holy Polycarp,” in *Ante-Nicene Fathers* Vol.1 Hedrickson Publishers, Peabody, MA, 2004, pp.39-44) depict the Jews ready to denounce and even persecute the Christians. Fourthly, the anarchical and quasi-nihilist attitude of some millennial Christians led to disobedience towards the Roman authorities. Just to paraphrase Professor Floca, in the expectation of Christ’s Second Coming,

numerous early Christians were “filled with a religious zeal which pushed them into emotional disequilibrium, as they often displayed attitudes of rejection towards social establishments, civic authority and public order.” Arhid. Prof. Dr. Ioan N. Floca *Drept Canonic Ortodox, Legislatie si Administratie Bisericeasca, Vol. 1-2* Editura Institutului Biblic si de Misiune al Bisericii Ortodoxe Române: Bucuresti, 1990. See vol.2, p.288

The negative secular factors emerged from the strong sense of equalitarianism promoted by Christianity which altered the established class relations between slaves and their owners (threatening monopoly over property and workforce), ethnic groups (threatening the citizenry status), and spouses (social order) – all posing a real threat to the social establishments of the Roman State. Secondly, Christianity were usually labeled as a “Jewish sect” meaning a religious force that had access to masses, and a presumptive ally of the enemies of the Roman State. During 55 - 56AD, Emperor Claudiu ordered the expulsion of all the Jews from Rome for reasons of public disorder and this included Christians of Jewish origins as well. Furthermore, less than 10 years after the Jewish revolt from Palestine, Emperor Nero ordered the bloodiest persecution against the Christians on similar accounts of anti-Jewish suspicion. (cf. Arhid. Prof. Dr. Ioan N. Floca *Drept Canonic Ortodox, Legislatie si Administratie Bisericeasca, Vol. 1-2* Editura Institutului Biblic si de Misiune al Bisericii Ortodoxe Române: Bucuresti, 1990. See vol. 2, p.292

¹⁰ As Eusebius of Caesarea informs in his work *De Vita Constantini* (On the Life of Constantine), Emperor “Galerius, in terror of death, issued the famous edict of toleration.” Cf. *Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers* Vol. 1, p.416. The text of the edict is found in the work of Lactantius *De mortibus persecutorum* (On the Death of the Persecutors, cf. *Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers* Vol. 7, pp.320 - 321.) Emperor Galeriu’s edict declared that “Christians are allowed to exist again,” and that the Christians, “will be able to hold from now on – freely – all their conventicula (gatherings); to build churches only under the condition that they would not disturb public order, and do not break the State laws.” In exchange for this privilege, the Christians were required to pray to their God for the health of the Emperor, for the prosperity of the State, as well as their own prosperity.

¹¹ Eusebius of Caesarea *Ecclesiastic History* X, 5, 1-17 & Lactantiu *De mortibus persecutorum* 48, 2-12. Yet, this edict received strong opposition and was never implemented throughout the Roman Empire. It was only two years later in 313AD through the Edict of Milan granted by Constantine and Licinius that Christianity became a religion equal to all other religions within the Roman Empire. The reasons invoked by Constantine and Licinius were those of public security; cf. Ioan N. Floca *Drept Canonic Ortodox, Vol. 2*, p. 293-294.) Emperor Constantine transformed the Christian Church into a dominant religious power even in relation to the official Roman cult despite his retaining the religious title of *Pontifex Maximus* until his deathbed, when

he was baptized Christian. Admired for his wisdom, Emperor Constantine was proclaimed *sanctus* by the Christians and *divinus* by the pagans.

- ¹² “It being clearly in accordance with the tranquility of our times that each one should have the liberty of choosing and worshiping whatever deity he pleases.” Eusebius of Caesarea *Ecclesiastic History* X, 5, 8, cf. *Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers* Vol. 1, p.379.
- ¹³ The Emperors usually called for ecumenical councils to ensure that the Church preserved its dogmatic unity, while their theological decisions were enforced through public law. If under Emperor Constantine the Church becomes one of the state religions, in 380AD Emperor Theodosius I (379 - 395) decreed that Christianity should be *the only* State religion. Starting with the second ecumenical council, every dogmatic decision became State law and the Church turned into the main political ally of the Roman Empire. As a political partner, the Church used its influence not only to consolidate the State’s power internally, but also to cautiously sanction the State’s policies of defense against the barbaric invasions, which began during the second half of the fourth century. In return, the State defended the Church against the pagans and heretics through the *nomocanons* and *novelas*, whereby the State rather than the Church was the one to enforce dogmatic orthodoxy. In 418AD, Emperor Theodosius II (408 – 449), also known as “Theodosius The Young,” elaborated *Codex Theodosianus* which included all the canons and dogmatic decisions from all Ecumenical Councils.
- ¹⁴ Emperor Justinian called the Fifth Ecumenical Council in 553AD not only for doctrinal clarifications, but more for the purpose of strengthening the unity of the Church. Furthermore, he requested that all future bishops be highly erudite. A rather illustrative observation of Emperor Justinian’s involvement in Church affairs is offered by Professor Floca, when he writes that, “by renewing strategic confessions of Christian faith either through State laws and regular legislation, or through the forewords and the introductions to his collections of laws (*Codex* and *Novelae*), by adding other confessions through which the content of Nicaeo-Constantinopolitan the Symbol of Faith is reproduced, and by declaring all dogmatic decisions of the first four ecumenical councils as equal to the Scripture, Emperor Justinian appears in the posture of a Pontifex Maximus of the Church.” Arhid. Prof. Dr. Ioan N. Floca *Drept Canonic Ortodox, Legislatie si Administratie Bisericeasca*, Vol. 1-2 Editura Institutului Biblic si de Misiune al Bisericii Ortodoxe Române: Bucuresti, 1990. See vol. 2, pp.299-300
- ¹⁵ The superseding authority of the Church laws inherited since Emperor Marcian found its decline with the *iconoclastic* crisis. This crisis put the Byzantine State not only in a posture of hostility towards the Church, but the Church was simply persecuted by the State. This crisis was resolved only under Ecumenical Patriarch Photius (835-867; 877-886).
- ¹⁶ ‘Guaranteed inferiority’ is an expression coined by the Oxford scholar Timothy (Kalistos) Ware in his work *The Orthodox Church* (Penguin Group, 1993),

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and it emerges from the nature of Islamic Law (Sharia), which based on the *Dustur al-Madinah* (Constitution of Medina 622A.D.), regarded Christianity and Judaism as a heretical rather than false religions. In this way, jihad is not to be declared against Christians and Jews, but be offered a status of inferiority and subjected to high taxation. (See Majid Khadduri *War and Peace in the Law of Islam*, The John Hopkins Press: Baltimore, London, 1969)

- ¹⁷ 'Captivity' is a term preferred by Steven Runcimann in his seminal work *The Great Church in Captivity: A Study of the Patriarchate of Constantinople from the Eve of the Turkish Conquest to the Greek War of Independence* (Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, UK, 1985)
- ¹⁸ Although the Orthodox Church lost numerous assets, it recognized the right of the sultan to invest the Ecumenical Patriarch of Constantinople, and it retained its key positions inherited from the Byzantines, such as the recognition of bishops as State dignitaries with authority over the Christians only. During the Ottomans, all Slavic states along with the Romanian principalities inherited the Byzantine Church-State model of political relations. The Prince (or the Czar) was given the honor of a Byzantine Emperor, while the Metropolitan received that of a Patriarch's. The *bi-cephalous* Byzantine model was implemented in the feudal states with no hesitation, whereby bishops and abbots were respected as state dignitaries and feudal seniors. All political issues were discussed in councils that included both political rulers and religious leaders, with the Metropolitan as an honorary president. The main Byzantine legislation inherited by the feudal states included the typical Basilicals and nomocanons.
- ¹⁹ The expression *theory* is not based on heuristic devices imposed by the rules of social sciences, but it is used in its generic and etymologic sense, whereby the Greek word *theoria*, means *looking at*. In other words, this "theory of adaptability" as related to Church-State relations in the Orthodox Christian experience, is based on an unsophisticated observation of historical records. As history provides sufficient data, one can easily assume that a "theory of adaptability" could be built and tested under the rules of social sciences. (See Pamela J. Shoemaker, James William Tankard, Jr., and Dominic L Lasorsa *How to Build Social Science Theories*, Sage Publications: London, 2004.)
- ²⁰ For instance, the standard textbook on orthodox ethics used in the Romanian theological schools with the endorsement of the Holy Synod of the Romanian Orthodox Church states that, "According to the ethos of our Church, the Christian Ethics is concerned with the State only within the framework of the State's mission as a 'political and juridical unit of human society on a limited territory.' Therefore, the Church does not have its own concept of State, which would be imposed into the consciousness of the faithful. According to our teachings, it is the authority of the State itself and not of a particular political system or doctrine that has divine origins. 'Let every soul be subject to the governing authority. For there is no authority except from

God, and the authorities that exist are appointed by God.' (Romans 13:1)" The Church regards the State – whose organic basis is given by the people living on a specific territory – as a "moral and organic unit" entrusted with the mission of defending and promoting the common good, through laws and policies, which are the general social premises necessary for progress. *Teologia Morala Ortodoxa*, Vol.2 p.301.

- ²¹ Radu Preda "Biserica în stat. Sanele și limitele unei dezbateri" p.367, in *Gândirea Socială a Bisericii: fundamente, documente analize, perspective*, edited by Ioan I. Ica, Jr. and Germano Marani, Deisis Press: Sibiu, 2002
- ²² See Roland H. Bainton *Christian Attitudes Toward War and Peace: A Historical Survey and Critical Re-evaluation*, Abingdon, Nashville (ninth printing 1979) pp.53-100
- ²³ James C. Russell *The Germanization of Early Medieval Christianity: A Sociohistorical Approach to Religious Transformation*, Oxford University Press: New York, Oxford, 1994, p.212
- ²⁴ Arhid. Prof. Dr. Ioan N. Floca *Drept Canonic Ortodox, Legislatie și Administratie Bisericeasca*, Vol. 1-2 Editura Institutului Biblic și de Misiune al Bisericii Ortodoxe Române: Bucuresti, 1990. See vol. 2, pp.279
- ²⁵ "Whose rule, his religion"
- ²⁶ Antonio Cassese "The Historical Evolution of the International Community" in *International Law* (Second Edition) Oxford University Press: Oxford 2005 pp. 22-45.
- ²⁷ Eric Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger, Eds *The Invention of Tradition*, Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, 1992.
- ²⁸ Patrick J. Geary *The Myth of Nations* Princeton University Press, 2003
- ²⁹ Benedict Anderson *Imagined Communities: Reflexions on the Origins and Spread of Nationalism*, Verso Press, 2006.
- ³⁰ "Pietism," says Pinson, "brought into the eighteenth century Germany an emotionalism and enthusiasm which were hitherto lacking. This provided the emotional basis for subsequent nationalism. In addition, Pietism introduced and diffused the concepts of individuality and of multiplicity and variety, which provided the doctrine of nationalism with a philosophic basis. Pietism, therefore, in appealing to the lower classes gave them the greater feeling of self-respect and prestige and thus helped to cement the widely separated classes into a unified whole. The appeal to the lower classes involved, in turn, a more intensive cultivation of the language of the lower classes, German, as opposed to the learned Latin and the aristocratic French, a more concentrated effort at public education and an increased concern with social welfare and philanthropy." See, Koppel S. Pinson *Pietism as a Factor in the Rise of German Nationalism*, Columbia University Press: New York, 1934 (introduction), as quoted by John B. Moose in his review published in *Church History*, Vol.4, No.1. (Mar., 1935), p.79. Regarding the extensive research performed by Pinson, John B. Moose points out the seventeen pages of bibliography tracing German pietism from sermons, moralistic works, reli-

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gious poetry, etc... See John B. Moose's review of "Pietism as a Factor in the Rise of German Nationalism," in *Church History*, Vol.4, No.1. (Mar., 1935), p.79-80

³¹ Richard Falk *Religion and Humane Global Governance*, Palgrave Macmillan, 2001, pp.1-12

³² Ioan I Ica, Jr. "Biserica, societate, gândire în Rasarit, în Occident și în Europa de azi" p.47 in *Gândirea Socială a Bisericii: fundamente, documente analize, perspective*, edited by Ioan I. Ica, Jr. and Germano Marani, Deisis Press: Sibiu, 2002. See also A. Bensancon, *La confusion des langues La crise ideologique de l'Eglise*, Calmann-Levy 1978, note 28

³³ Antonio Cassese "The Main Legal Features of International Community" in *International Law* (Second Edition) Oxford University Press: Oxford 2005 pp. 3-21. See also Richard Falk *Religion and Humane Global Governance* Palgrave Macmillan Press, 2001, p.42

³⁴ Richard Falk, *idem*, p.12

³⁵ Richard Falk, *idem*, pp. 61-76

³⁶ Ioan I Ica, Jr. "Globalizarea: Mutatii și Provocari" p.489. in *Gândirea Socială a Bisericii: fundamente, documente analize, perspective*, edited by Ioan I. Ica, Jr. and Germano Marani, Deisis Press: Sibiu, 2002. See also *Biserica în Misiune: Patriarhia Română la ceas aniversar*, Editura Institutului Biblic și de Misiune al Bisericii Ortodoxe Române, București, 2005. pp. 694-695

³⁷ "The overall aim of third way politics," says Anthony Giddens, "should be to help citizens pilot their way through the major revolutions of our time: *globalization, transformations in personal life and our relationship to nature*. Third way politics should take a positive attitude towards globalization – but, crucially, only as a phenomenon ranging much more widely than the global marketplace. Social democrats need to contest economic and cultural protectionism, the territory of the far right, which sees globalization as a threat to national integrity and traditional values." See Anthony Giddens *The Third Way: The Renewal of Social Democracy*, Polity Press: Cambridge, UK, 2003: p.64

³⁸ Ioan I Ica, Jr. "Biserica, societate, gândire în Rasarit, în Occident și în Europa de azi" p.47 in *Gândirea Socială a Bisericii: fundamente, documente analize, perspective*, edited by Ioan I. Ica, Jr. and Germano Marani, Deisis Press: Sibiu, 2002

³⁹ David Hollenbach *The Common Good and Christian Ethics*, Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, UK, 2002. p.102

⁴⁰ Ioan I Ica, Jr. "Biserica, societate, gândire în Rasarit, în Occident și în Europa de azi" p.49 in *Gândirea Socială a Bisericii: fundamente, documente analize, perspective*, edited by Ioan I. Ica, Jr. and Germano Marani, Deisis Press: Sibiu, 2002

⁴¹ Dumitru Staniloae "Statele Unite ale Europei?" in *Telegraful Român*, LXXXVII, nr.47, 1939, p.1. See also, Dumitru Staniloae *Natiune și Creștinism*, Editura Elion, București, 2004.

- ⁴² Dumitru Staniloae quotes *The Church Times* October 27, 1939
- ⁴³ See Max Weber's work *On Charisma and Institution Building*, Selected Papers Edited and with an Introduction by S.N. Eisenstadt. The University of Chicago Press: Chicago & London, 1968.
- ⁴⁴ "In order to achieve the United States of Europe it is necessary to first of all Christianize the souls," said Fr. Staniloae. "Within the framework of the League of Nations, Europe has a recent experience that through simple paragraphs from the statutes, or through brotherhoods established on ideas other than Christian, one can not achieve durable peace and unity amongst Europe's people. The demon of human selfishness displays its power through the behavior of groups, which is exaggerated and deviated. Subjected to a strong human selfishness and pride, the national sentiment turns into an exclusivist imperialist passion and desire to submit other smaller nations. Who can guarantee that within the United States of Europe, unless the few strong nations would clash with one another in their endeavor towards supremacy, would guarantee the inherent rights of smaller nations, would cease to bring them under their sphere of influence, and would prevent any attempt towards self affirmation?" Dumitru Staniloae *Natiune si Crestinism*, Editura Elion, Bucuresti, 2004, p.99
- ⁴⁵ Responding to the developmentalist studies of the 1950s and 1960s, Samuel P. Huntington in his 1968 influential book *Political Order in Changing Societies: The Governing of Restless Nations* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press), suggested that "instead of focusing on social change, scholars and government officials should concentrate on building strong institutions capable of handling change, such as armies, bureaucracies, and political parties." Cf. Howard J. Wiarda *Introduction to Comparative Politics: Concepts and Processes* Second Edition, Thomson Wadsworth, 2000, p.57
- ⁴⁶ Dumitru Staniloae *Natiune si Crestinism*, Editura Elion, Bucuresti, 2004, p.100
- ⁴⁷ Tomáš Špidlík "Le difficoltà della democrazia nei Paesi slavi," in *Politica dell'Est. Una lettura critica del ruolo dei cristiani nel sociale e nel politico*, a cura del Centro Aletti, Ed. Lipa, Roma, 1995, p.17-24. See also Tomáš Špidlík „Dificultatile democratiei în tarile din Estul Europei” pp.385-390, in *Gândirea Sociala a Bisericii: fundamente, documente analize, perspective*, edited by Ioan I. Ica, Jr. and Germano Marani, Deisis Press: Sibiu, 2002
- ⁴⁸ Tomáš Špidlík „Dificultatile democratiei în tarile din Estul Europei” p.387, in *Gândirea Sociala a Bisericii: fundamente, documente analize, perspective*, edited by Ioan I. Ica, Jr. and Germano Marani, Deisis Press: Sibiu, 2002.
- ⁴⁹ As Professor Špidlík writes, "Democracy presupposes a continuous recycling of leaders. Those who today get into positions of maxim responsibility, tomorrow they fall and turn into simple citizen. And, they have to accept this course of events with a smile of the face. The Slavic Orthodox reaction to such changes is usually referred to through comments such as: 'Poor him, yesterday he was famous, but today... just look at him!' An Englishman hearing such sobbing from a Slav had furiously replied: 'Why poor him! He

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did his job, the hell with him! Who cares!" See Tomáš Špidlík „Dificultatile democratiei în tarile din Estul Europei” p.387, in *Gândirea Sociala a Bisericii: fundamente, documente analize, perspective*, edited by Ioan I. Ica, Jr. and Germano Marani, Deisis Press: Sibiu, 2002.

- ⁵⁰ In my personal missionary work towards establishing Saint Parascheva Romanian Orthodox Church in Boston I often noted that if a person's idea gets classified as lower in priority, that person takes this as a personal insult.
- ⁵¹ As Professor Špidlík concludes, The Orthodox, and the Slavs are indeed capable of democracy, but they first need to know and respect one another to be able to build a harmony from opposing elements. If they will succeed in realizing this, they will certainly play a very significant role in our increasingly pluralist society. Tomáš Špidlík „Dificultatile democratiei în tarile din Estul Europei” p.390, in *Gândirea Sociala a Bisericii: fundamente, documente analize, perspective*, edited by Ioan I. Ica, Jr. and Germano Marani, Deisis Press: Sibiu, 2002.
- ⁵² Dumitru Staniloae „De ce suntem ortodocsi” in *Teologie si viata*, serie noua, anul I (LXVII) Nr. 4-8, aprilie-august 1991, p.15
- ⁵³ It is often argued that sarcasm has a strong therapeutic effect ensuring a people's survival under an oppressive regime. In the Romanian case, this seems to be an inheritance of a Roman moral philosophy coined by the proverb which says, *Ridendo castigat mores* 'by laughter one derides the wrong ways of life.'
- ⁵⁴ Mircea Vulcanescu “Crestinul in lumea moderna” p.84, in *Gândirea Sociala a Bisericii: fundamente, documente analize, perspective*, edited by Ioan I. Ica, Jr. and Germano Marani, Deisis Press: Sibiu, 2002.

